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Only rarely are law-
yers and other citizens
treated to the educa-
tion in Constitutional
Law that Americans
have had in the last two
years. President Ford's
pardon of former Presi-
dent Nixon was a con-
troversial act involving
the pardoning power.
The author, a constitu-
tional law scholar, reviews in this article the
legal basis of the President's pardoning power.
the
pardoning
power
of article II
of the
constitution
JOHN D. FEERICK
NEW YORK CITY
Following President Gerald Ford's uncondi-
tional pardon of former President Richard
Nixon on September 8, 1974, claims were made
that the pardon was invalid because it came be-
fore indictment and conviction. Special Prose-
cutor Leon Jaworski was urged to test its validi-
ty in court. Indeed, one federal judge expressed
in open court the view that the public interest
required the pardon's validity to be tested. The
Special Prosecutor's decision not to proceed ap-
pears well founded when a review is made of
the history of the President's pardoning
power.'
Common Law Antecedents
At the common law the king possessed and
exercised the power to pardon offenses against
the Crown both before and after indictment
and conviction.' He could grant pardons un-
conditionally or conditionally, based on the
performance of some condition precedent or
subsequent. This power of the Crown was de-
signed to allow for the dispensation of mercy in
cases where it was deserved. It was given to the
King because "nothing higher is acknowledged
than the magistrate, who administers the laws;
and it would be impolitic for the power of judg-
ing and pardoning to centre in one and the
same person." 3
One of the few common law limitations on
the power was imposed by the Act of Settle-
ment, which provided that a pardon could not
be pleaded in bar of an impeachment; however,
the Act did not prohibit a pardon after an im-
peachment conviction.4 The Settlement Act's
limitation arose because of a pardon granted
Lord Danby in the 1670's prior to his impeach-
ment by the House of Commons. Another lim-
itation on the power was that it could not im-
pair a third party's right to sue civilly.5 Accord-
ing to Blackstone, a pardon was void if the King
was misinformed or deceived in granting it.6
I See generally, Humbert, The Pardoning Power of
the President (1941).
Z Maitland, The Constitutional History of England,
479-80 (1926); Blackstone's Commentaries, Book IV,
Ch. 31, pp. 7 30-31 (Browne ed. 1897).
3 Blackstone, supra note 2, at 730.
4 Maitland, supra note 2, at 480.
5 Id. at 479.
6 Blackstone, supra note 2, at 731.
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The effect of a King's pardon was to make "the
offender a new man" and acquit "him of all
corporal penalties and forfeitures annexed to
that offense, for which he obtains his
pardon. '7
Colonial Antecedents
The governors of both the royal and proprie-
tory colonies possessed the power to grant par-
dons.8 This power was fixed in some cases by
colonial charter and in others by the Crown's
instrument of instructions to the governors it
commissioned. Generally, the pardoning prerog-
ative of the governor was exercisable inde-
pendently of the colonial council. In the royal
colonies, the power extended to all cases except
those of treason and murder.
In the state constitutions which were
adopted following the Declaration of Independ-
ence the provisions pertaining to the executive
reflected the colonial enmity which had devel-
oped against the King's governors. In most
states the governor was elected by the legis-
lature and his term was limited to one year. His
power of appointment and veto were restricted,
as was his power to pardon. In several colonies
where the governor was authorized to grant par-
dons, cases of impeachment were placed
beyond the power's reach. In New York the
governor could grant pardons in such cases but
not in cases of treason and murder.
When the Constitutional Convention as-
sembled in 1787, these colonial and common
law antecedents strongly influenced the dele-
gates in framing the pardoning provision of
Article II of the Constitution: "[H] e shall have
power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Of-
fenses Against the United States, except in
Cases of Impeachment."
Constitutional Convention
Interestingly, none of the principal plans of
government presented at the outset of the Con-
stitutional Convention of 1787 contained a par-
doning provision. It was not until the Com-
mittee of Detail rendered its report of August
7 Id. at 732.
8 See Humbert, supra note 1.
6, 1787 that the subject surfaced.' That report
provided for a President to be elected by the
legislature and entrusted, among others powers,
with the broad power to grant pardons and re-
prieves. The one limitation, taken from the Act
of Settlement, was that a pardon could not be
pleadable in bar of an impeachment.'
The first discussion of the Committee's
recommended clause took place on August 25,
when a motion was made and defeated to re-
quire the Senate's consent before the President
could grant a pardon. Thereupon, the limitation
of the Act of Settlement was dropped in favor
of a provision that simply excluded cases of
impeachment from the reach of the power."
Two days later Luther Martin sought to limit
the exercise of the power to the period after"conviction"."2 He withdrew his motion, and
thereby made significant legislative history,
when James Wilson argued that the exercise be-
fore conviction should be allowed because such
an exercise might be necessary to obtain the
testimony of accomplices. On September 15
Edmund Randolph sought to remove cases of
treason from the reach of the power, arguing
that the President himself might be guilty of
treason and therefore use the power to suppress
the truth. The delegates divided on the point,
with some delegates, including Madison, believ-
ing the power should be shared with the legis-
lature. Others, including Morris and King,
argued against such a sharing. Randolph argued
that a combination of the President and Senate
constituted too great a danger to liberty. King
asserted that a legislature would be "governed
too much by the passions of the moment."
Wilson, who favored the President having the
power alone and opposed excluding cases of
treason from its reach, said that if the President
9 Hamilton's plan of government, which was never
formally considered, did contain a provision allowing
the President to pardon all offenses except treason,
which required the the Senate's consent. Since an ex-
act copy of Pinckney's original plan has never been
located, it is in dispute whether his plan contained a
pardoning provision. 3 The Records of the Federal
Convention of 1787, at 597-601 (Farrand ed. 1911&
1937 & 1966).
10 2 Id. at 185.
'a Id. at 419-20.
12 Id. at 426.
THE PARDONING POWER
"a pardon in our days is not a
private act of grace from an indi-
vidual happening to possess
power. it is a part of the consti-
tutional scheme."
himself were guilty of treason, the impeach-
ment power would be available to deal with
such a situation. By a vote of 8 to 2, Ran-
dolph's motion was defeated and no further dis-
cussion on the pardoning power occurred prior
to the Convention's submission of the Constitu-
tion to the states. 13
Post-Convention Discussion
Much of the discussion of the pardoning
power in the post-convention period focused on
the failure of the Constitution to exclude cases
of treason from the power's reach. Concern was
expressed that the President 'could use the
power before indictment to stop investigations
that might reveal his involvement in treasonous
activities. 14 The most extensive discussion of
the power appeared in Number 74 of The
Federalist. There, Hamilton gave these reasons
for having such a power:
"The criminal code of every country par-
t ,kes so much of necessary severity that
without an easy access to exceptions in favor
of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a
countenance too sanguinary and cruel."
As for one person possessing the power, he
said:
"As the sense of responsibility is always
strongest in proportion as it is undivided, it
may be inferred that a single man would be
most ready to attend to the force of those
motives which might plead for a mitigation
of the rigor of the law, and least apt to yield
to considerations which were calculated to
shelter a fit object of its vengeance. The re-
13 Id. at 626-27.
14 Humbert, supra note 1, at 18.
flection that the fate of a fellow-creature de-
pended on his sole fiat would naturally
inspire scrupulousness and caution; the
dread of being accused of weakness or conni-
vance would beget equal circumspection,
though of a different kind. On the other
hand, as men generally derive confidence
from their numbers, they might often en-
courage each other in an act of obduracy,
and might be less sensible to the appre-
hension of suspicion or censure for an injudi-
cious or affected clemency. On these ac-
counts, one man appears to be a more
eligible dispenser of the mercy of the govern-
ment than a body of men."
Hamilton further stated with respect to giving
the President the power to grant pardons in
cases of treason:
"But the principal argument for reposing the
power of pardoning in this case in the Chief
Magistrate is this: in seasons of insurrection
or rebellion, there are often critical moments
when a well-timed offer of pardon to the
insurgents or rebels may restore the tran-
quility of the commonwealth; and which, if
suffered to pass unimproved, it may never be
possible afterwards to recall. The dilatory
process of convening the legislature or one
of its branches, for the purpose of obtaining
its sanction to the measure, would fre-
quently be the occasion of letting slip the
golden opportunity. The loss of a week, a
day, an hour, may sometimes be fatal. If it
should be observed that a discretionary
power with a view to such contingencies
might be occasionally conferred upon the
President, it may be answered in the first
place that it is questionable, whether, in a
limited Constitution that power could be
NEW YORK STATE BAR JOURNAL, JANUARY 1975
delegated by law; and in the second place,
that it would generally be impolitic before-
hand to take any step which might hold out
the prospect of impunity. A proceeding of
this kind, out of the usual course, would be
likely to be construed into an argument of
timidity or of weakness, and would have a
tendency to embolden guilt."
Cases 5
Between 1833 and 1927 the Supreme Court
had occasion to discuss the pardoning power in
a number of cases. These cases, while at odds
on certain aspects of the power, make clear that
the power may be exercised any time after
commission of an offense against the United
States, both before and after indictment and
conviction. Set forth below is a discussion of
the principal decisions.
1. Nature of a Pardon
In United States v. Wilson, the Court, in an
option by Chief Justice Marshall, gave this
description of a pardon:
"A pardon is an act of grace, proceeding
from the power intrusted with the execution
of the laws, which exempts the individual on
whom it is bestowed from the punishment
the law inflicts for a crime he has com-
mitted. It is the private, though official act
of the executive magistrate delivered to the
individual for whose benefit it is intended,
and not communicated officially to the
court. It is a constituent part of the judicial
system that the judge sees only with judicial
eyes, and knows nothing respecting any par-
ticular case, of which he is not informed
judicially. A private deed, not communi-
cated to him, whatever may be its character,
Is A discussion of state cases construing the gov-
ernor's pardoning power is beyond the scope of this
article. Suffice it to say that substantially all state con-
stitutions explicitly limit the exercise of the power to
the period after conviction. Where there is no such
specific limitation, case law indicates that the power
can be exercised prior to conviction. See, e.g.,
Dominick v. Bowdoin, 44 Ga. 357 (1871); State v.
Woolery, 29 Mo. 300 (1860); and Oklahoma Territory
v. Richardson, 9 Okla. 579 (1900).
whether a pardon or release, is totally un-
known and cannot be acted on." 6
Almost 100 years later, in Biddle v.
Perovich, the Court gave a different emphasis to
the power, stating:
"... A pardon in our days is not a private
act of grace from an individual happening to
possess power. It is a part of the constitu-
tional scheme. When granted it is the deter-
mination of the ultimate authority that the
public welfare will be better served by in-
flicting less than what the judgment
fixed .... Just as the original punishment
would be imposed without regard to the
prisoner's consent and in the teeth of his
will, whether he liked it or not, the public
welfare, not his consent, determines what
shall be done .... ,17
2. Extent of Power
In Ex parte Garland, the Court was faced
with the effect of a pardon granted by Presi-
dent Andrew Johnson to one Garland for all
offenses committed by him arising from his
participation in the Civil War. Prior to the
granting of the pardon, Congress had passed an
Act providing that before any individual could
practice law in the federal courts he had to take
an oath stating that he had never voluntarily
bore arms against the United States or given aid
to its enemies.
The Court, finding the Act to be unconstitu-
tional as constituting a bill of attainder, held
that the pardon relieved Garland from all penal-
ties and disabilities, including the oath. Said the
Court:
"It extends to every offense known to the
law, and may be exercised at any time after
its commission, either before legal proceed-
ings are taken, or during their pendency, or
after conviction and judgment."' 8
(Continued on page 42)
16 7 Pet. 150, 160-61 (1833).
17 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927).
18 4 Wall 333, 380 (1867). Even the dissent con-
ceded that a pardon could be pleaded in bar of an
indictment for any of the acts covered by the pardon.
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